읽는 시간 2분

역내 안보: 이란, 방공, 홍해

이스라엘과 사우디아라비아는 이란의 미사일과 선박에 대한 후티의 공격 등 서로 겹치는 안보 우려를 안고 있다. 공개된 조약으로 통합 이스라엘-아랍 방위 동맹이 수립된 것은 아니며, 협력은 구체적인 합의에 달려 있다.

Miriam Bernstein

Miriam Bernstein은(는) Hasbara 자료 데스크의 필명입니다. 모든 기사는 출처를 근거로 하며 인용을 밝힙니다.

Saudi Arabia and Israel share concerns about Iranian military capabilities and attacks by Iran-backed groups, but shared concerns do not prove a formal bilateral defense alliance. No public Israel-Saudi treaty establishes an integrated air-defense system. Any future coordination would need defined participants, command arrangements, and rules for sharing radar and warning data.

Iran and regional coordination

Iran has supplied and supported armed groups across the region, including Yemen’s Houthi movement. Israel and Saudi Arabia have each had reasons to monitor Iranian missiles and drones, and the United States has worked with regional partners on air and missile defense. But the April 2024 defense against Iran’s direct attack on Israel was a multinational effort involving the United States and other partners; it is not evidence on its own of a standing Saudi-Israeli alliance. The CRS report describes existing U.S.-Saudi security cooperation and the proposed agreements under discussion.

What the Red Sea attacks changed

On January 10, 2024, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2722, condemning at least two dozen Houthi attacks on merchant and commercial vessels since November 19, 2023, when the Houthis seized the Galaxy Leader and its crew. The resolution demanded an end to attacks and affirmed the importance of navigational rights and freedoms. A later UN Panel of Experts report found the Houthis targeted vessels in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden indiscriminately, despite claiming to target ships linked to Israel.

That campaign threatened commercial crews and disrupted a route connecting the Indian Ocean with the Suez Canal and Mediterranean. The UN’s summary of Resolution 2722 records the Council’s findings and demand; the UN Panel report documents the broader pattern.

Where cooperation could fit

Protecting shipping and warning against missile launches are practical interests for states around the Red Sea. Regional arrangements could include information exchange, escort operations, or coordinated air defense, but the existence and scope of each arrangement should be described from attributable evidence. The January 2024 UN resolution encourages states to support maritime safety and capacity building; it does not create a Saudi-Israeli mechanism.

Formal normalization could make overt contacts easier and could connect Israeli and Gulf security policy more directly. It would not automatically produce a joint force or guarantee that Riyadh participates in every operation. The main stakes are safer navigation, protection from Iranian and Houthi attacks, and preventing cooperation from being described more broadly than the evidence supports. See the overview for the wider diplomatic package.

출처

  1. 1.https://mandates.un.org/mandate/S/RES/2722%20%282024%29
  2. 2.https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/259/53/pdf/n2425953.pdf
  3. 3.https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R48162
  4. 4.https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4085185/files/S_2025_455-EN.pdf